Education: Ph.D., Economics, Northwestern University BA, Economics, Davidson College Fields of Specialization: Industrial Organization, Applied Microeconomics Contact Information: 227B Social Sciences Box 90097, Durham, NC 27708-0097 919-660-1822 (office) 919-684-8974 (fax) j.roberts"at"duke"dot"edu

Curriculum Vitae

Curriculum Vitae (Updated 4/12)

Published and Forthcoming Papers

Can Warranties Substitute for Reputations?
AEJ Microeconomics, 3(3), 2011.
Copyright 2011: American Economic Association

Network Structure of Production (with Enghin Atalay, Ali Hortacsu and Chad Syverson)
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 108(13), 2011.
Supporting material here.
Copyright 2011: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.

Entry into Auctions: An Experimental Analysis (with Seda Ertac and Ali Hortacsu)
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 29(2), 2011.
Copyright 2010: Elsevier B.V.

Working Papers

Competition versus Auction Design (with Andrew Sweeting)
Replaces: Entry and Selection in Auctions (NBER Working Paper 16650).

When Should Sellers Use Auctions? (with Andrew Sweeting)
NBER Working Paper 17624.

Unobserved Heterogeneity and Reserve Prices in Auctions (Updated Version Coming Soon)

Gender Disparity in Urology: Preferences, Competition, and Quality of Care (with Ryan McDevitt)

Robust Firm Pricing with Panel Data (with Ben Handel and Kanishka Misra)

Speculators and Middlemen: The Role of Flippers in the Housing Market (with Patrick Bayer and Christopher Geissler)
NBER Working Paper 16784.

Research in Progress

Public Procurement with Selective Entry (with Vivek Bhattacharya and Andrew Sweeting)

This project extends the above working paper ("Entry and Selection in Auctions") to asymmetric first price auctions, which allows us to consider counterfactuals such as bid-subsidy programs.

The Real Effect of Potential Competition in Merger Analysis (with Andrew Sweeting)

This project extends the ideas about selective entry to non-auctions settings and in particular the effects on mergers.

Competition and Dynamic Revenue Management in a Perishable Goods Market (with Andrew Sweeting)

Most revenue management models assume that the seller is a monopolist. In this project we investigate the optimal strategy of a large seller who knows that his pricing and listing decisions can move the future distribution of market prices, using a dynamic model in continuous time.

Links

Duke Economics

Auction Data from Penn State's CAPCP