

Discussion of “Firm Risk and Leverage-Based Business Cycles” by Sanjay Chugh

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Summary

- This is a very interesting paper on the role of “risk shocks” in explaining business cycle fluctuations.
 - “Risk shocks”: time variation in the cross-sectional distribution of firm level productivity.
- 1 Empirical part:
 - ▶ measure “risk shocks” based on US micro data.
 - ▶ measure cyclical fluctuations in the leverage cycle.
 - 2 Theoretical part: analyze a DSGE financial-accelerator model.
- Argues that risk shocks explain a large share of financial fluctuations and a **small** share of real fluctuations.
 - ▶ for the benchmark model, risk shocks are procyclical.

Risk shock: overall effect

- The quantitative effect:
 - 1 Magnitude of the shocks.
 - 2 Propagation mechanism.
- Paper addresses both aspects.
- I will focus on the propagation mechanism.

Literature on risk shocks

- Aggregate stochastic volatility in a medium scale DSGE model (Justiniano and Primiceri (2007), Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2007)): small first order effects.
- Stochastic volatility interacted with:
 - 1 non-convex adjustment costs (real options): increase in uncertainty can lead to recessions through "wait and see" (Bloom (2009), Bloom, Floetotto and Jaimovich (2009), Bachmann and Bayer (2009)).
 - 2 **financial frictions:**
 - ▶ Arrelano, Bai and Kehoe (2010) : high volatility increases the risk of costly liquidation → firms reduce scale.
 - ▶ Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2009), Dorofeenko, Lee and Salyer (2008) are financial accelerator models: high volatility leads to recessions.

Empirical part of the paper 1: size of risk shocks

- Consider the following production function:

$$y_{i,t} = \theta_t \omega_{i,t} f(k_{i,t}, n_{i,t})$$

- Aimed at getting a measure of time variation in the volatility of $\omega_{i,t}$.
- There is a growing empirical work on measuring this time variation:
 - ▶ measures and conclusions differ.
- Here find (relatively) larger time-variation than the existing micro-data based literature: why is this approach better?

Empirical part of the paper 2: leverage ratios

- Leverage ratio, defined as book value of debt/book value of equity.
- Contribution: construct cyclical properties.
 - ▶ much larger cyclical volatilities during “Great moderation”
 - ▶ leverage is moderately countercyclical.
- Stylized fact from corporate finance lit.: firms issue equity over debt in booms (Korajczyk and Levy 2003, Dittmar and Dittmar 2008).
- How easily can we test models against these findings?
 - ▶ countercyclicality of leverage seems to require a theory of firm's choice over capital structure (e.g. Levy and Hennessy (JME, 2007)).
 - ▶ difficult here: model allows only for issuing debt as external financing.
 - ▶ in the model: leverage ratio = value of debt/value of accumulated net worth (internal funds).

Theoretical model

- DSGE financial accelerator model with time-varying idiosyncratic productivity risk.
- Based on Carlstrom and Fuerst (ET, 1998): “output model”.
 - ▶ firm (entrepreneur) produces consumption goods.
 - ▶ uses capital and labor.
 - ▶ needs external financing.
- Different from other financial accelerator models with time-varying risk shocks:
 - ▶ CF (AER, 1997) “investment model”: in Dorofeenko, Lee and Salyer (2008).
 - ▶ BGG (1999): in Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2009).

Risk shocks and investment: role of financial frictions

- With CSV, financial accelerator models result in a one period standard debt contract:
 - ▶ pay an interest to the bank if above a liquidation threshold $\bar{\omega}_t$.
 - ▶ default, turn over the assets and be monitored by the bank if below $\bar{\omega}_t$.
- In a standard debt contract, the lender faces only the downside risk.
- An increase in volatility of outcomes leads to a decrease in expected payoffs for lender
 - ▶ it shifts the loan supply curve upwards.
 - ▶ equilibrium: higher premium and less loans (investment).
- This mechanism is present in existing DSGE models:
 - ▶ makes risk shocks **countercyclical**.
 - ▶ procyclical leverage ratios.
 - ▶ depending whether friction on demand or supply of capital, it leads to a procyclical (countercyclical) price of capital.

Theoretical model: key differences from literature

① The production function of the firm that needs external financing:

- ▶ Here:

$$y_{i,t} = \theta_t \omega_{i,t} k_{i,t}^\alpha n_{i,t}^{1-\alpha}$$

- ▶ CF (1997) investment model and BGG (1999):

$$y_{i,t} = \omega_{i,t} k_{i,t}$$

- ▶ in all models $\omega_{i,t}$ is private information (Costly State Verification).

② Friction in the supply vs. demand for capital.

- ▶ here financial friction is on the input demand side (both labor and capital).
- ▶ in BGG (1999): demand for capital.
- ▶ in CF (1997): supply of capital.
- ▶ what is the role of adding labor?

Risk shocks and investment: “Hartman-Abel” effect

- Here the “output model” assumption makes a big difference.
- Take for example competitive factor prices and the prod.fct:


$$y = Ak^\alpha n^v, \quad \alpha + v < 1$$

- “Hartman-Abel” effect: an increase in the volatility of technology leads to an increase in demand for inputs \rightarrow risk shocks **procyclical**.


$$k^* = \phi_1 A^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha-v}}; \quad n^* = \phi_2 A^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha-v}}$$

- ▶ optimal input choices are convex in technology.
- can be eliminated with a re-normalization of $A \rightarrow A^{1-\alpha-v}$.
- Here, production function is constant returns to scale ($\alpha + v = 1$).
 - ▶ agency costs show up as an endogenous markup $p_t > 1$ paid by firm.
 - ▶ it effectively makes the resulting prod. fct look like DRS.
- Effect is **absent** in CF (AER, 1997) or BGG (linear prod.fcts.)

Effect of higher risk: role of financial frictions



Effect of higher risk: role of Abel effect



Conclusion

- paper studies risk shocks and financial frictions in a DSGE model.
- the consumption good producer is subject to the financial friction.
- propagation mechanism: effect of higher risk is a combination of two general forces:
 - ▶ financial frictions: produces recessions.
 - ▶ Hartman-Abel effect: produces booms.
- Suggestion on the model: shut down (temporarily) the Hartman-Abel channel.
 - ▶ would help to better understand the contribution of adding labor demand to the financial friction.