Some Problems with Falsificationism in Economics*

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In a recent review of Mark Blaug's *The Methodology of Economics* in this journal (14, 1984, 115-25), D. W. Hands points out that Blaug's treatment of contemporary philosophy of science and his assessment of various research programmes in economics reveal an inconsistency (1984, pp. 122-23).

The fundamental problem of Blaug's criticism of economic practice is that it either completely neglects, or at least is inconsistent with, everything he stated in his survey of philosophy of science. His principal criticism is that there is not enough 'falsification' or even 'falsifiability' in modern economics. In light of the previously discussed work of Kuhn, Feyerabend, Lakatos, et al., one is inclined to retort—so what! The unambiguous conclusion of recent philosophy of science, which Blaug so accurately surveys in Part I, is that no science does that which Blaug criticizes economics for not doing.

If Blaug is caught in an inconsistency (and I believe that he is), he must give up either his position on philosophy or his optimism about the prospects for putting falsificationism to work in economics.

Though Hands's points are well-taken, they would not persuade a convinced Popperian. An advocate of falsificationism would first note that Popper has responded to his growth of knowledge critics, none of whose positive programmes have themselves escaped unscathed from criticism. He would next argue that, since falsificationism is a prescriptive methodology, its failure to be tried so far should not count against it: the point of a prescriptive methodology is to change behaviour, after all. And finally, a proponent would point out that the general claim that falsificationism may not work in the social sciences is unimpressive unless it is supported by specific reasons why one should expect it to be unsuccessful.

To complete the task begun in Hands's review, it is necessary to demonstrate that falsificationism is, indeed, an inapplicable methodological stance for economics. After briefly describing falsificationism, such a demonstration is attempted.

1. FALSIFICATIONISM DEFINED

Defining falsificationism is not easy. It should come as no surprise that Popper's views have undergone some modification in the roughly fifty years since the publication of *Logik der Forschung* in 1934. Nor is it possible here to include his views on inductivism, fallibilism, verisimilitude, critical rationalism, objective knowledge, and so on.1 Fortunately, all that is necessary in relating fal-

1 Those unfamiliar with Popper's work should begin with the autobiography in Schilpp, ed. (1974), or, for a shorter version, Popper (1965), Chapter 1. Next, see Popper (1934); Eng. trans. 1959), (1965), and (1972). The best secondary source is Ackermann (1976).
sificationism to the problems encountered by the working economist is a description of how falsificationism applies to the testing of scientific hypotheses.

Simply put, a necessary and sufficient condition for the application of falsificationism in economics is that straightforward tests of hypotheses be possible. A test of an hypothesis is always conditional. Every conditional hypothesis is composed of two parts: an explanandum and an explanans. The explanandum is a sentence describing the phenomenon to be explained. The explanans contains sentences comprising a list of initial conditions which must obtain (these can include both the variables impounded in ceteris paribus and those in which a change is assumed to occur), and sentences presenting general laws. For a straightforward test of an hypothesis to occur, the initial conditions and general laws must be clearly specifiable and specified. In addition, any empirical proxies which are chosen to represent theoretical concepts must permit a true test of the theory. Finally, the data themselves must be clean.  

If all of these conditions are met, the results of tests of hypotheses are relatively easy to interpret. Confirmin instances, as always, cannot prove that a hypothesis is true. But disconfirming test instances will direct scientists to reinspect the initial conditions, general laws, data and test situation to see what went wrong. If each of these is clearly defined, problems are discovered and corrected, and by this slow, critical, trial and error process, science may hopefully advance. The argument against the workability of falsificationism in economics is based on the contention that rarely will all of the conditions mentioned above be met. Not surprisingly, growth of knowledge philosophers made the same point in criticizing the workability of Popper's methodology in the natural sciences.  

As Hands suggests, the problems seem even more serious in the social science of economics.

2. OBSTACLES TO FALSIFICATIONISM IN ECONOMICS

a. Initial conditions are numerous—It is impossible to specify all of the necessary initial conditions in any test situation, even in the laboratory sciences. As a practical matter, however, one can begin to have confidence about the results of a test if the important determining variables are finite in number and specifiable. A true test of a theory occurs if all the exogenous variables are known, one is varied while the others are held constant, and the effects are noted. Obviously, such carefully controlled experimentation cannot occur in economics. In general, not all exogenous variables are known, and a number of them vary simultaneously. This does not preclude the possibility of testing in economics, however: multivariate analysis is expressly designed for handling these problems. Why then have certain economists claimed that a large number of exogenous variables somehow damages the credibility of tests of hypotheses in economics? There are, I think, two distinct complaints lying behind such a claim.

Some critics charge that the models of economists give a distorted, incorrect representation of reality. This argument is often made by Institutionals, who prefer a more holistic approach to social phenomena. Thus Wilber and Harrison assert that the use of a ceteris paribus clause in a closed, causal model lends a

2 This discussion follows Hempel and Oppenheim's (1948) presentation of deductive explanation under covering laws, but is completely compatible with Popper's model of deductive explanation as developed in his (1959).

3 For example, this is the reasoning underlying Lakatos' (1970) views on the absence of crucial tests and 'instant rationality' in science, which leads him to conclude, 'The main difference from Popper's original version is, I think, that in my conception criticism does not—and must not—kill as fast as Popper imagined' (p. 179).

4 Wilber and Harrison (1978); Schoefller (1955). This point has been made by a number of economists in their writings on methodology; see, for example, Hutchison (1938), Machlup (1955; 1966), Grunberg (1978).

5 In demand theory, 'tastes and preferences' and 'expectations of future prices and income' play this role. In Friedman's (1974) theoretical model of the demand for money, he includes the variable u, which is a portmanteau symbol standing for whatever variables other than income may affect the utility attached to the services of money' (p. 13).

6 Regarding tastes and preferences, another gambit, developed by Stigler and Becker
the theories are tested empirically: neither confirming nor disconfirming instances are unambiguously interpretable if these initial conditions cannot be independently tested.7

3. Absence of falsifiable general laws—Though economists often use the term 'economic law', it is used to refer to a wide variety of propositions. Compared to the many debates over how the term general law should be defined within the philosophy of science, economists have virtually ignored the question in their methodological debates.

Some consider the rationality postulate to be the fundamental behaviour law in economics: Hutchison and Machlup took this approach in their debate in the fifties, for example.8 If that is the case, then economists must admit that their most basic general law is not directly testable.9 This poses no problem for instrumentalists, who only require that theories be evaluated by how well their predictions conform to reality. But a falsificationist, who requires that disconfirming test instances be treated seriously, would be alarmed to find out that disconfirming test instances cannot be unambiguously interpreted, that one can never know whether the assumed initial conditions or the behavioural law has been falsified. Though the theoretical definition of rationality has been resolved by economists (transitivity in choice over a well-ordered preference function), its empirical interpretation has always remained problematic. Can rationality be defined in the absence of full information? Is there a difference between short run and long run rationality? Does Simon's (1976) distinction between substantive and procedural rationality hold any promise for resolving this dilemma? The questions go on and on.

There are other candidates for general laws in economics. The law of diminishing marginal returns is certainly one. But, as is often noted, this hypothesis when correctly stated only implies that returns will eventually diminish. This necessary caveat renders the 'law' effectively unfalsifiable, however: one may always respond to a disconfirming instance that we 'simply have not reached the point of diminishing returns yet'. And indeed, perhaps the major difference between the Classical and modern treatments of the law of diminishing returns is that, whereas the classicals believed the law was operative and observable in history, modern economists view it as an analytic device.

The 'law' of demand is another example. In a recent work, Terence Hutchison (1977) points out that, in the absence of checkable initial conditions, especially regarding tastes, prices of other goods, and price expectations, the law is effectively untestable. Hutchison also comments on so-called empirical laws in economics, and compares them with laws in the natural sciences (pp. 19-20).

Since very few or no fully adequate scientific laws, in the physico-chemical or natural scientific sense, have been established in economics, on which economists can base predictions, what are used, and have to be used, for predictive purposes are trends, (1977), to claim that tastes and preferences are themselves determined by income and relative prices, hence analyzable using the usual tools of the economist.

7 This can be easily shown. Say the rationality postulate (transitivity in choice over a well-ordered preference function) is tested using the revealed preference approach. Transitive choice is taken to mean the consumer is rational, but if his preference function was not well-ordered (because tastes changed or information was imperfect), transitivity in choice reveals the consumer as irrational. Similarly, if intransitivities are revealed, is the consumer irrational, or do we assume that there was a change in one of the initial conditions?

8 Hutchison (1956), Machlup (1955; 1956).

9 See footnote 7.

tendencies, or patterns, expressed in empirical or historical generalizations of less than universal validity, restricted by local and temporal limits.

Hutchison cites as an example that, even if the elasticity of demand for herrings over a period of years lay between 1.2 and 1.45, 'it surely cannot be claimed to be a universal law, that in all markets, in all countries, at all times, the elasticity of demand for herrings is, and has always been, between 1.2 and 1.45'. Hutchison concludes that the primary contribution of economists 'must inevitably come from trend-spotting, not by deduction from laws' (pp. 21, 22).

As he did some forty years ago, Hutchison argues in his book against the idea that economics proceeds by deduction from universal laws. As he admits, his is a somewhat skeptical position: even well-tested generalizations that have performed perfectly in the past need not be applicable in the future, especially if the structural relationships within an economy change. Empiricism is then still quite important to Hutchison. But it must also be recognized that, in the absence of checkable initial conditions and general laws, the hope for the success of falsificationism in economics grows dimmer.

d. Tests of models are not tests of theories—Though this idea can be found in Papandreou's Economics as a Science (1958), it has been forcefully and eloquently restated in a recent piece by Boland (1977). He notes that the concept of testability has been variously interpreted by economists, but settles on the definition, 'empirically refutable'. He then argues that, for three reasons, 'it is impossible to test any economic theory convincingly even when it is not tautological' (p. 93). Two of these reasons concern the nature of testing and of logic, and are similar to arguments that have already been made. The third, however, is unique. Boland shows that, to test a theory, a model must be constructed. However, a wide variety of models may be constructed to represent any theory. As a result, the empirical falsification of any single model does not imply the falsification of the theory. Falsification of theories, as opposed to models, is thus impossible in economics (pp. 93-103).

e. Empirical data may not accurately represent theoretical constructs—A final obstacle to falsificationism in economics concerns the interpretation of data. Many economists have commented on the 'aggregation problem' in economics, a problem that refers to the difficulties that are encountered both in aggregating data in macroeconomics, and in providing meaningful interpretations of what those data are meant to represent.10 But even when microeconomic data are used, problems may arise. In his discussion of how economists might 'operationalize' the seemingly innocuous construct, 'the price of steel', Fritz Machlup concludes that 'one could propose as many as fifty different sets of operations, all sensible and reasonable, but yielding different findings' (1966, p. 58). Wilber and Harrison offer a more general, and pointedly skeptical, assessment of this problem (1978, p. 69).

Both the methods of collection and construction of economic data are unreliable. Typically, economic data are statistically constructed and are not conceptually the same as the corresponding variables in the theory. Therefore, econometricians and statisticians engage in data massaging. If a test disconfirms a hypothesis, the investigator can always blame the data: they have been massaged, either too much or not enough.

10 For some discussions of the many forms of aggregation problems confronting economists, see Blaug (1975), Lancaster (1966), Morgenstern (1979). Schelling (1978) offers an eclectic and highly readable approach to the aggregation problem in the social sciences generally; his book is suitable for classroom use in many disciplines.
3. CONCLUSION

Falsificationism does not guarantee that its use will lead scientists always to choose the 'true' theory. It is a more modest methodology of theory appraisal—its aim is only the avoidance of error; its method is to eliminate theories that have been falsified by strict empirical tests. But for falsificationism to be viable, straightforward empirical tests must be possible. This requires that general laws be present; that initial conditions be relatively few in number, known, not subject to change, and easily checkable; that a test be a test of a theory, not a model; that data be trustworthy, complete, and accurately representative of analogous constructs in the theory. It is now perhaps understandable why falsificationism, though dominant in the methodological literature, seems to have been little practiced by working economists.

The invocation to try to put falsificationism into practice in economics need not be dropped, though it seems that there is little chance for its successful application. What must be avoided is the wholesale rejection of research programmes that do not meet the falsificationist criteria of acceptability, for that would lead to an elimination, not only of alternative research programmes like those proposed by Austrians and Institutionlalists, but much of standard economic theory, as well.11

For their part, I think economic methodologists could better serve their profession by attempting the sort of 'empirical philosophy of history' mentioned by Hands (p. 3). Though the problems of circularity and irrationality which plague that approach are formidable, it still seems to make sense for economic methodologists to start with the practice of economists, rather than with the writings of prescriptive philosophers of science, in coming to terms with the methodology of their discipline.

REFERENCES

-------- (1956) 'Professor Machlup on Verification in Economics', Southern Economic Journal, 22, 476-83.
-------- (1977) Knowledge and Ignorance in Economics. Chicago.


11 This point is recognized by Blaug (1980), p. 259.