

# Internet Appendix for

## The Impact of Hedge Funds on Asset Markets

This internet appendix provides supplemental analyses to "The Impact of Hedge Funds on Asset Markets".

The first section describes a Monte Carlo simulation to study the finite-sample size of our extension of Clark and West (2006). The second section presents a stylized model to study how hedge fund style "drift" or style misreporting can affect the informativeness of an illiquidity index based on funds from a single style category relative to an aggregate index based on all hedge funds. In the last section, we present a table with detailed results for predictive in-sample regressions for US corporate bonds. The tables and figures are as follows:

Table IA.I: Clark-West Extension Rejection Probabilities When Null Hypothesis Is True

Table IA.II: Clark-West Extension Rejection Probabilities When Null Hypothesis Is False

Figure IA.I: Clark-West Extension Test Statistic Distribution

Table IA.III: In-Sample Predictive Performance of US Corporate Bonds

Figure IA.II: Hedge Fund Style Indices vs. an Aggregate Index

## A Monte Carlo Simulation Study

To study the finite-sample size of this extension of Clark and West (2006) we conduct a small simulation study. The target variable and forecasts are generated as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 Y_t &= \gamma^* + \beta^* \bar{X}_t + \varepsilon_t, \\
 \text{where } \bar{X}_t &\equiv \frac{1}{k} \sum_{i=1}^k X_{it} \\
 [X'_t, \varepsilon_t]' &\sim iid N(0, \mathbf{I}_{k+1}) \\
 \hat{Y}_{t+1|t}^{(1)} &= \hat{\gamma}_t \\
 \hat{Y}_{t+1|t}^{(2)} &= [1, X'_{t+1}] \hat{\beta}_t
 \end{aligned} \tag{IA.1}$$

To study the finite-sample size properties of the test, we set  $\beta^* = 0$ , and so the DGP includes just a constant,  $\gamma^*$ . In this case both models are correct, but Forecast 1 will do better in finite samples because it does not include any irrelevant variables. To study power we let  $\beta^* = 0.1$ , which means that each of the included regressors in Forecast 2 is useful, and Forecast 1 is misspecified.

We consider in-sample estimation period lengths of  $R \in \{100, 200, 500, 1000, 5000\}$ , and an out-of-sample evaluation period of  $P = 1000$ . The number of extra regressors in the larger model is set to  $k \in \{1, 5, 10\}$ . We repeat the simulation 1000 times.

In Table IA.I we present the finite-sample rejection probabilities when the null hypothesis is true, using 0.05 level tests. We report our proposed “adjusted” test, as well as the usual “unadjusted” test, which corresponds to the Diebold and Mariano (1995) test. Table IA.I shows that the unadjusted test is very conservative (with rejection probabilities much lower than 0.05), particularly for small  $R$ . The “adjusted” test provides better size control, with rejection probabilities closer to the nominal 0.05 level. The improvement from the adjustment is particularly great when  $k$  is large and  $R$  is small, consistent with theory.

Table IA.II reports rejection probabilities when the null is false, which provides insights into the power of the adjusted and unadjusted tests. Consistent with the results under the null, the unadjusted test has low power to reject the null when it is false, and we see that the adjusted test has much better power than the unadjusted test. Figure IA.I illustrates where the gains come from: the adjusted test re-centers the distribution of test statistics on zero, which makes the test less conservative under the null, and more powerful under the alternative.

**Tabel AI.I: Rejection Probabilities When Null Hypothesis Is True**

This table presents the rejection probabilities from the "unadjusted" and "adjusted" tests of equal predictive accuracy, at the 0.05 level. R represents the length of the in-sample estimation period; k represents the number of regressors in the larger model (excluding the constant).

	R=100	R=200	R=500	R=1000	R=5000
k=1					
Unadjusted	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.002	0.013
Adjusted	0.030	0.027	0.031	0.019	0.031
k=5					
Unadjusted	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.013
Adjusted	0.049	0.035	0.042	0.050	0.049
k=10					
Unadjusted	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.009
Adjusted	0.057	0.042	0.047	0.046	0.043

**Tabel AI.II: Rejection Probabilities When Null Hypothesis Is False**

This table presents the rejection probabilities from the "unadjusted" and "adjusted" tests of equal predictive accuracy, at the 0.05 level. R represents the length of the in-sample estimation period; k represents the number of regressors in the larger model (excluding the constant).

	R=100	R=200	R=500	R=1000	R=5000
k=1					
Unadjusted	0.014	0.079	0.249	0.382	0.450
Adjusted	0.631	0.741	0.846	0.906	0.923
k=5					
Unadjusted	0.014	0.364	0.869	0.949	0.962
Adjusted	0.997	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
k=10					
Unadjusted	0.004	0.599	0.996	0.998	1.000
Adjusted	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000




Figure IA.I: Distribution of the test statistics from the "unadjusted" and "adjusted" tests across 1000 simulations. The in-sample period length is 200 and the out-of-sample length is 1000 observations. The larger model includes a single extra regressor (left panel) or 10 extra regressors (right panel).

## Hedge Fund Style Indices vs. an Aggregate Index

This appendix presents a stylized model to study how hedge fund style “drift” or style misreporting can affect the informativeness of an illiquidity index based on funds from a single style category relative to an aggregate index based on all hedge funds.

Consider the following simple framework. There are  $N$  individual hedge funds (with  $N$  large; in our empirical application it is 29,496). There are  $S = 10$  different styles (to match our empirical application), and we will assume that there are  $K = N/S$  funds in each style.

Assume that for each hedge fund style there is an asset index that is “close” to that style, so there are also  $S$  asset indices. (e.g., Fixed income hedge funds and corporate bond returns, security selection hedge funds and equity returns, etc.) Returns on each asset class index are linked to liquidity, and have a component that is not related to liquidity:

$$r_{s,t+1} = \alpha_s^* + \beta_s^* L_{s,t}^* + u_{s,t+1}^*, \quad s = 1, 2, \dots, S \quad (\text{IA.2})$$

We will assume that all parameters are the same across styles, all shocks are mean zero, Normal, homoskedastic, and independent from each other.

Hedge fund returns for funds in a given style provide us with a noisy estimate of the liquidity of that asset class:

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{L}_{i,t} &= L_{s(i),t}^* + \eta_{i,t}, \quad \text{for } i = 1, 2, \dots, N \\ \text{where } s(i) &\in \{1, 2, \dots, S\} \end{aligned} \quad (\text{IA.3})$$

$s(i)$  is the style of hedge fund  $i$ . (In our application our noisy estimate of hedge fund liquidity is based on autocorrelations; we abstract from that particular measure here and simply consider a generic noisy measure of liquidity.) We average the liquidity estimates from each fund in style  $s$  to obtain an aggregate liquidity index for that style:

$$\bar{L}_{s,t} = \frac{1}{K} \sum_{i=1}^N \tilde{L}_{i,t} \mathbf{1}\{s(i) = s\} \quad (\text{IA.4})$$

and across all funds to get an aggregate liquidity index:

$$\bar{L}_t = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \tilde{L}_{i,t} \quad (\text{IA.5})$$

We use the (noisy) liquidity indices extracted from hedge fund returns in a regression to try to

predict future asset index returns:

$$r_{s,t+1} = \tilde{\alpha}_s + \tilde{\beta}_s \bar{L}_{s,t} + \tilde{u}_{s,t+1}, \quad s = 1, 2, \dots, S \quad (\text{IA.6})$$

Clearly, the closer  $\bar{L}_{s,t}$  is to  $L_{s,t}^*$ , the better this prediction will be.

### Case 1: Styles are correctly reported

In this baseline case

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{L}_{s,t} &= \frac{1}{K} \sum_{i=1}^N (L_{s,t}^* + \eta_{i,t}) \mathbf{1}\{s(i) = s\} \\ &= L_{s,t}^* + \frac{1}{K} \sum_{i=1}^N \eta_{i,t} \mathbf{1}\{s(i) = s\} \\ &\equiv L_{s,t}^* + \epsilon_{s,t}, \quad \epsilon_{s,t} \sim N\left(0, \frac{1}{K} \sigma_\eta^2\right) \end{aligned} \quad (\text{IA.7})$$

The estimated coefficient on  $\bar{L}_{s,t}$  is:

$$\tilde{\beta}_s = \frac{\text{Cov}[\bar{L}_{s,t}, r_{s,t+1}]}{V[\bar{L}_{s,t}]} = \frac{\text{Cov}[L_{s,t}^* + \epsilon_{s,t}, r_{s,t+1}]}{V[L_{s,t}^* + \epsilon_{s,t}]} = \beta_s^* \frac{1}{1 + \sigma_\eta^2 / (K \sigma_L^2)} \quad (\text{IA.8})$$

where  $\sigma_L^2 = V[L_{s,t}^*]$ . This is the familiar shrinkage of a regression parameter towards zero when the dependent variable is measured with error. The  $R^2$  of this model is

$$\tilde{R}^2 = \text{Corr}[\bar{L}_{s,t}, r_{s,t+1}]^2 = \frac{\text{Cov}[L_{s,t}^*, r_{s,t+1}]^2}{(\sigma_L^2 + \frac{1}{K} \sigma_\eta^2) \sigma_r^2} = R^{*2} \frac{1}{1 + \sigma_\eta^2 / (K \sigma_r^2)} \quad (\text{IA.9})$$

where  $R^{*2}$  is the  $R^2$  from the regression if we could directly observe  $L_{s,t}^*$ , and  $\sigma_r^2 = V[r_{s,t+1}]$ . Next, we compare the above base case with what is obtained in the presence of style mislabelling, style drift, etc.

### Case 2: Style “mis-labelling”

Perhaps because of style drift, or style mis-reporting, or just errors in classifying the hedge fund style, it may be that a fund that is listed as being in style  $s$  is actually in style  $j$ . Let  $p$  be the probability that the reported style label, denoted  $\tilde{s}(i)$ , is correct, i.e.,

$$p = \Pr[\tilde{s}(i) = s(i)] \quad (\text{IA.10})$$

and assume this is the same across funds. For simplicity, assume that when the label is *incorrect*, the label is randomly chosen from the remaining  $S - 1$  styles.

To obtain the main results for this case, we will use the fact that

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \mathbf{1}\{\tilde{s}(i) = s, s(i) = s\} &\approx E[\mathbf{1}\{\tilde{s}(i) = s, s(i) = s\}] \text{ for } N \text{ large} \quad (\text{IA.11}) \\
&= \Pr[\tilde{s}(i) = s, s(i) = s] \\
&= \Pr[\tilde{s}(i) = s | s(i) = s] \Pr[s(i) = s] \\
&= p \frac{1}{S}
\end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \mathbf{1}\{\tilde{s}(i) = s, s(i) = j \neq s\} &\approx E[\mathbf{1}\{\tilde{s}(i) = s, s(i) = j \neq s\}] \quad (\text{IA.12}) \\
&= \Pr[\tilde{s}(i) = s, s(i) = j \neq s] \\
&= \Pr[\tilde{s}(i) = s | s(i) = j \neq s] \Pr[s(i) = j \neq s] \\
&= \frac{1-p}{S-1} \frac{1}{S}
\end{aligned}$$

So we can obtain:

$$\begin{aligned}
\bar{L}_{s,t} &= \frac{1}{K} \sum_{i=1}^N \left( L_{s(i),t}^* + \eta_{i,t} \right) \mathbf{1}\{\tilde{s}(i) = s\} \quad (\text{IA.13}) \\
&= \sum_{j=1}^S L_{j,t}^* \frac{1}{K} \sum_{i=1}^N \mathbf{1}\{\tilde{s}(i) = s, s(i) = j\} + \underbrace{\frac{1}{K} \sum_{i=1}^N \eta_{i,t} \mathbf{1}\{\tilde{s}(i) = s\}}_{\equiv \epsilon_{s,t} \sim N(0, \sigma_\eta^2 / K)} \\
&= L_{s,t}^* \frac{1}{K} \sum_{i=1}^N \mathbf{1}\{\tilde{s}(i) = s, s(i) = s\} + \sum_{j=1, j \neq s}^S L_{j,t}^* \frac{1}{K} \sum_{i=1}^N \mathbf{1}\{\tilde{s}(i) = s, s(i) = j\} + \epsilon_{s,t} \\
&= L_{s,t}^* \frac{N}{K} \frac{p}{S} + \sum_{j=1, j \neq s}^S L_{j,t}^* \frac{N}{K} \frac{1-p}{S-1} \frac{1}{S} + \epsilon_{s,t} \\
&= p L_{s,t}^* + \frac{1-p}{S-1} \sum_{j=1, j \neq s}^S L_{j,t}^* + \epsilon_{s,t}
\end{aligned}$$

using the fact that  $N/K = S$ . This last line expresses  $\bar{L}_{s,t}$  as a weighted average of each of the individual style indices. We can re-write it to be a weighted average of just the target style

index and the “All” index:

$$\begin{aligned}
\bar{L}_{s,t} &= pL_{s,t}^* + \frac{1-p}{S-1} \sum_{j=1, j \neq s}^S L_{j,t}^* + \epsilon_{s,t} \\
&= pL_{s,t}^* + \frac{1-p}{S-1} \sum_{j=1}^S L_{j,t}^* + \epsilon_{s,t} - \frac{1-p}{S-1} L_{s,t}^* \\
&= \frac{pS-1}{S-1} L_{s,t}^* + \frac{1-p}{S-1} \sum_{j=1}^S L_{j,t}^* + \epsilon_{s,t} \\
&= \frac{pS-1}{S-1} L_{s,t}^* + \frac{S(1-p)}{S-1} \bar{L}_t^* + \epsilon_{s,t}
\end{aligned} \tag{IA.14}$$

Note that the noise term,  $\epsilon_{s,t}$ , does not depend on  $p$ , but it *does* depend on  $K$  through its variance. When  $p = 1$  the style label is always correct and we obtain:

$$\bar{L}_{s,t} = L_{s,t}^* + \epsilon_{s,t} \tag{IA.15}$$

as in the base case. When  $p = 1/S$  the style label is correct as often as a random guess and we obtain

$$\bar{L}_{s,t} = \frac{\frac{1}{S}S-1}{S-1} L_{s,t}^* + \frac{S(1-\frac{1}{S})}{S-1} \bar{L}_t^* + \epsilon_{s,t} = \bar{L}_t^* + \epsilon_{s,t} \tag{IA.16}$$

That is, when the labels are randomly applied, the index average is equal to the aggregate index average plus some measurement error.

The above calculations reveal the “bias-variance” trade-off between using a style-specific index and using an aggregate index: When we average across all funds we get an index centered on the average liquidity,  $\bar{L}_t^*$ , which is not really what we want (a form of bias), but it has small measurement error (lower variance):  $\epsilon_t \sim N(0, \sigma_\eta^2/N)$ . When we average across just those funds in the style we care about we get an index that is more heavily weighted on the style we care about (for values of  $p > 1/S$ ), but it has greater measurement error:  $\epsilon_{s,t} \sim N(0, \sigma_\eta^2/K)$ .

To find the “threshold” value for  $p$  that makes these two approaches equally accurate, we need to take a stand on the correlation between liquidity factors in different styles. To generate correlation between liquidity in different asset classes, we assume a simple factor structure. Let:

$$L_{s,t}^* = \gamma L_{c,t}^* + \nu_{s,t}, \quad s = 1, 2, \dots, L \tag{IA.17}$$

Without loss of generality, let  $V[L_{c,t}^*] = 1$ , and then note that  $\sigma_\nu^2 = \sigma_L^2 - \gamma^2$ . Note that the  $R^2$  of this regression is:

$$\rho_c^2 \equiv \text{Corr}[L_{s,t}^*, L_{c,t}^*]^2 = \frac{\gamma^2}{\gamma^2 + \sigma_\nu^2} = \frac{\gamma^2}{\sigma_L^2} \tag{IA.18}$$

Then we obtain:

$$\begin{aligned}
Cov [L_{s,t}^*, L_{j,t}^*] &= \gamma^2 \\
\text{and } Cov [r_{s,t+1}, L_{s,t}^*] &= \beta^* \sigma_L^2 \\
Cov [r_{s,t+1}, L_{j,t}^* | j \neq s] &= Cov [r_{s,t+1}, \gamma L_{c,t}^* + \nu_{j,t}] \\
&= Cov \left[ r_{s,t+1}, \gamma \left( \gamma \frac{1}{\sigma_L^2} L_{s,t}^* + z_t \right) + \nu_{j,t} \right] \\
&= \gamma^2 \frac{1}{\sigma_L^2} Cov [r_{s,t+1}, L_{s,t}^*] \\
&= \rho_c^2 \beta^* \sigma_L^2
\end{aligned} \tag{IA.19}$$

So if the common component is very strong ( $\rho_c$  is near  $\pm 1$ ) then using the “wrong” style liquidity does not matter; it is almost as good as the right style. When the common component is weak, the covariance is pulled towards zero.

Now consider the  $R^2$  from the predictive regression using the aggregate index. First we obtain the covariance between the aggregate index and a given asset style return:

$$\begin{aligned}
Cov [\bar{L}_t, r_{s,t+1}] &= \frac{1}{S} Cov [L_{s,t}^*, r_{s,t+1}] + \frac{1}{S} \sum_{j=1, j \neq s}^S Cov [L_{j,t}^*, r_{s,t+1}] \\
&= \frac{1 + (S-1) \rho_c^2}{S} \beta^* \sigma_L^2
\end{aligned} \tag{IA.20}$$

and the variance of the aggregate index:

$$\begin{aligned}
V [\bar{L}_t] &= \frac{1}{S^2} V \left[ \sum_{j=1}^S L_{j,t} \right] + V [\epsilon_t] = \frac{1}{S^2} V [S \gamma L_{c,t}^*] + \frac{1}{S^2} \sum_{j=1}^S V [\nu_{j,t}] + \frac{1}{N} \sigma_\eta^2 \\
&= \frac{(S-1) K \gamma^2 + K \sigma_L^2 + \sigma_\eta^2}{N} \\
&= \frac{(S-1)}{S} \gamma^2 + \frac{1}{S} \sigma_L^2 + \frac{1}{N} \sigma_\eta^2
\end{aligned} \tag{IA.21}$$

Combing the above we find that the  $R^2$  is

$$\begin{aligned}
R_{all}^2 &= \frac{(1 + (S-1) \rho_c^2)^2 K \beta^{*2} \sigma_L^4}{(S-1) N \rho_c^2 \sigma_L^2 + N \sigma_L^2 + S \sigma_\eta^2} \frac{1}{\sigma_r^2} \\
&= (1 + (S-1) \rho_c^2)^2 \frac{K}{S} \frac{1}{((S-1) K \rho_c^2 + K + \lambda^2)} R^{*2},
\end{aligned} \tag{IA.22}$$

where  $\lambda^2 \equiv \frac{\sigma_\eta^2}{\sigma_L^2}$  and  $R^{*2} \equiv Corr [L_{s,t}^*, r_{s,t+1}]^2 = \frac{\beta^{*2} \sigma_L^2}{\sigma_r^2}$ .

We can contrast this  $R^2$  with that obtained from the individual style liquidity index:

$$R_s^2 = \frac{p^2 (S - 1) K}{(p^2 S - 2p + 1) K + (S - 1) \lambda^2} R_s^{*2} \quad (\text{IA.23})$$

Using these two expressions, we can solve for the value  $p^*$  that equates them. The solution is lengthy and we illustrate it below. The comparative statics reveal that the required proportion of correct individual style labels ( $p^*$ ) is higher when:

1. Holding the number of individual funds ( $N$ ) fixed, the number of hedge funds in each style ( $K$ ) is lower or the number of styles ( $S$ ) is higher: fewer funds per style means the individual style index is noisier.
2. The noise to signal ratio of each individual liquidity estimate ( $\lambda \equiv \sigma_\eta / \sigma_L$ ) is higher.
3. The correlation between the individual style liquidity measures and the common liquidity measure ( $\rho_c$ ) is higher: when this is higher the aggregate index does better, and so the style labels must be accurate with higher probability to counteract this.

In our data, the average correlation between our style indices is  $\rho_L = 0.5869$ , suggesting that  $\rho_c = 0.7661$ . This approximately corresponds to the thick solid line in Figure IA.II below.

In summary, Figure AI.II reveals that depending on the parameters that describe the model, it is possible that the individual style illiquidity index is always preferred, is never preferred, or is sometimes preferred to the aggregate index. Thus, which illiquidity index to use in practice is something that needs to be determined empirically.




Figure IA.II: Proportion of hedge funds with the correct style label needed to make the style liquidity index as good as the aggregate liquidity index. The x-axis shows the noise-to-signal ratio of individual liquidity measures, and the four lines consider differing degrees of correlation between liquidity across styles.

**Tabel AI.III: In-Sample Predictive Performance of US Corporate Bonds**

Reported are the signs of the predictors (in the case of multiple predictors, it stands for the sign of the hedge fund illiquidity measure), the adjusted  $R^2$  of the in-sample predictive regression in %, and the significance of the hedge fund illiquidity measure (\* for 10% and \*\* for 5%). The AUM weighted flows are not included in the multiple predictor regression. The time series starts in January 1997 and ends in December 2011. Newey-West standard errors are used.

<b>Panel A: Single Predictor</b>						
<b>Portfolios</b>	<b>Hedge Fund Illiq. Measure</b>	<b>Lagged Returns</b>	<b>Pastor- Stamb. Traded Liq. Factor</b>	<b>VIX AR(2) Shocks</b>	<b>VWM Excess Return</b>	<b>Hedge Fund Flows</b>
AAA1-3Y	(+) -0.56	(+) 1.15*	(-) -0.16	(+) 1.93**	(-) 4.88**	(-) -0.32
AAA3-5Y	(+) -0.44	(+) 0.15	(-) 0.25	(+) 1.89**	(-) 4.98**	(-) -0.56
AAA5-7Y	(+) -0.55	(+) -0.34	(-) -0.28	(+) 1.91**	(-) 5.59**	(+) -0.49
AAA7-10Y	(+) -0.39	(+) -0.23	(-) 0.23	(+) 1.84**	(-) 3.99**	(+) -0.42
AAA10-15Y	(+) -0.47	(-) -0.56	(-) 0.28	(+) 2.13*	(-) 4.68**	(+) -0.14
AAA15+Y	(+) -0.27	(-) -0.4	(-) 1.62*	(+) 2.05*	(-) 2.88**	(+) 0.81
AA1-3Y	(+) 1.33	(+) 1.45**	(-) 1.28	(+) -0.21	(-) 0.39	(-) 1.00
AA3-5Y	(+) 1.55	(+) 0.65*	(-) 1.42*	(+) 0.011	(-) 1.23	(-) -0.31
AA5-7Y	(+) 1.30	(+) -0.09	(-) 0.61	(+) -0.30	(-) 0.83	(-) -0.57
AA7-10Y	(+) 1.88*	(+) 0.53	(-) 1.45*	(+) 0.59	(-) 1.95**	(+) -0.56
AA10-15Y	(+) -0.05	(+) -0.45	(-) 0.97	(+) -0.11	(-) 1.08*	(+) 0.01
AA15+Y	(+) 2.01**	(+) -0.57	(-) 0.78	(+) -0.13	(-) 0.48	(-) -0.55
A1-3Y	(+) 4.96**	(+) 7.65**	(-) 0.21	(-) -0.20	(+) -0.51	(-) 0.70
A3-5Y	(+) 3.77**	(+) 2.53**	(-) 2.74**	(-) -0.46	(-) -0.49	(-) 0.15
A5-7Y	(+) 4.93**	(+) 2.40*	(-) 2.51**	(-) -0.56	(-) -0.28	(-) 0.06
A7-10Y	(+) 4.03**	(+) 2.17*	(-) 2.05**	(-) -0.51	(-) -0.37	(-) -0.40
A10-15Y	(+) 3.08**	(+) 0.06	(-) -0.11	(-) -0.51	(-) -0.20	(-) -0.10
A15+Y	(+) 4.09**	(+) 0.42	(-) 0.34	(-) -0.46	(-) -0.47	(-) -0.38
BBB1-3Y	(+) 9.23**	(+) 9.07**	(-) 0.13	(-) 4.76*	(+) 1.76	(-) 3.70*
BBB3-5Y	(+) 7.31**	(+) 6.27**	(-) 0.24	(-) 3.36	(+) 0.40	(-) 1.95
BBB5-7Y	(+) 7.73**	(+) 5.96**	(-) 1.89*	(-) 3.02	(+) 0.47	(-) 0.99
BBB7-10Y	(+) 7.02**	(+) 3.19*	(-) 1.69*	(-) 2.30	(+) -0.01	(-) 0.84
BBB10-15Y	(+) 5.92**	(+) 1.43*	(-) 1.39	(-) 1.39	(+) -0.47	(-) 0.59
BBB15+Y	(+) 6.94**	(+) 1.21	(-) 1.63*	(-) 0.95	(+) -0.30	(-) 0.12

Panel A (Continued): Single Predictor						
Port.	Hedge Fund Illiq. Measure	Lagged Returns	Pastor- Stamb. Traded Liq. Factor	VIX AR(2) Shocks	VWM Excess Return	Hedge Fund Flows
BB1-3Y	(+) 5.95**	(+) 10.16**	(-) 1.44*	(-) 5.76*	(+) 2.41**	(-) 2.16*
BB3-5Y	(+) 6.68**	(-) 8.54**	(-) 1.00	(-) 8.05*	(+) 3.45**	(-) 0.90
BB5-7Y	(+) 7.32**	(+) 8.51**	(-) 0.16	(-) 8.12*	(+) 2.94**	(+) 1.22
BB7-10Y	(+) 7.55**	(+) 6.92**	(-) 0.05	(-) 5.61	(+) 2.46*	(-) 1.56*
BB10-15Y	(+) 3.85**	(+) 4.26**	(-) 1.40*	(-) 9.18*	(+) 4.54**	(-) -0.19
BB15+Y	(+) 7.19**	(+) 12.33**	(-) -0.18	(-) 8.82**	(+) 6.63**	(-) 0.08
B1-3Y	(+) 3.59**	(+) -0.35	(-) 0.36	(-) 9.60**	(+) 5.28**	(-) 1.24
B3-5Y	(+) 6.97**	(+) 14.58**	(-) 0.87	(-) 14.65**	(+) 12.55**	(-) 0.27
B5-7Y	(+) 5.02**	(+) 6.39**	(-) 0.22	(-) 14.88**	(+) 10.14**	(-) -0.49
B7-10Y	(+) 6.46**	(+) 7.05**	(-) 1.92**	(-) 10.85*	(+) 7.34**	(-) 0.32*
B10-15Y	(+) 8.48**	(+) 1.78	(-) 0.16	(-) 7.49**	(+) 5.39**	(-) 0.61
B15+Y	(+) 9.11**	(+) 1.48	(-) 0.07	(-) 6.72**	(+) 6.30**	(-) 1.07
C1-3Y	(+) 2.70**	(+) 0.34	(-) 2.88**	(-) 8.36*	(+) 4.48**	(-) -0.51
C3-5Y	(+) 9.12**	(+) 12.41**	(-) 0.22	(-) 12.52**	(+) 12.14**	(-) -0.32
C5-7Y	(+) 8.30**	(+) 16.76**	(-) 0.20	(-) 16.13**	(+) 14.80**	(+) -0.39
C7-10Y	(+) 7.84**	(+) 8.23**	(-) 1.71**	(-) 8.49**	(+) 10.89**	(-) 0.10
C10-15Y	(+) 1.89	(+) 18.35**	(-) -0.02	(-) 9.43**	(+) 10.50**	(-) 1.51
C15+Y	(+) 6.55**	(+) 6.68**	(-) 0.09	(-) 10.73**	(+) 8.58**	(-) -0.37

<b>Panel B: Multiple Predictors</b>		
<b>Portfolios</b>	<b>Excl. Hedge Fund Illiq. Measure</b>	<b>Incl. Hedge Fund Illiq. Measure</b>
AAA1-3Y	4.044	(+) 3.497
AAA3-5Y	4.064	(+) 3.669
AAA5-7Y	4.228	(+) 3.731
AAA7-10Y	2.920	(+) 2.547
AAA10-15Y	3.619	(+) 3.196
AAA15+Y	3.115	(+) 2.768
AA1-3Y	2.361	(+) 3.208
AA3-5Y	2.588	(+) 3.735
AA5-7Y	1.002	(+) 2.165
AA7-10Y	3.172	(+) 4.589*
AA10-15Y	0.188	(+) 0.247
AA15+Y	2.625	(+) 4.421**
A1-3Y	8.165	(+) 10.962**
A3-5Y	3.308	(+) 6.039**
A5-7Y	3.134	(+) 6.747**
A7-10Y	3.888	(+) 6.728**
A10-15Y	0.865	(+) 3.659**
A15+Y	3.289	(+) 6.451**
BBB1-3Y	12.774	(+) 19.082**
BBB3-5Y	10.008	(+) 15.303**
BBB5-7Y	9.131	(+) 14.697**
BBB7-10Y	5.902	(+) 11.586**
BBB10-15Y	3.797	(+) 9.143**
BBB15+Y	4.490	(+) 10.089**
BB1-3Y	13.848	(+) 18.012**
BB3-5Y	14.112	(+) 19.392**
BB5-7Y	13.702	(+) 19.444**
BB7-10Y	11.400	(+) 16.890**
BB10-15Y	11.114	(+) 14.356**
BB15+Y	17.372	(+) 21.768**
B1-3Y	11.776	(+) 17.039**
B3-5Y	21.040	(+) 25.867**
B5-7Y	16.850	(+) 21.261**
B7-10Y	15.467	(+) 20.283**
B10-15Y	9.854	(+) 17.248**
B15+Y	8.348	(+) 16.629**
C1-3Y	8.613	(+) 11.311**
C3-5Y	17.016	(+) 24.015**
C5-7Y	24.612	(+) 30.102**
C7-10Y	14.204	(+) 19.865**
C10-15Y	20.996	(+) 22.165**
C15+Y	12.423	(+) 17.992**