Fiscal Policy and Openness: Is There a Trade-off Among Policies?

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Abstract

In this paper, an extended version of traditional growth regression exercises point to the existence of a negative relationship between the size of the distortion generated by fiscal policy and the degree of openness in the economy. However, the evidence also suggest that relatively open economies, even suffering less consequences of the distortions from fiscal policy, do not present an average higher economic growth. The growth regression of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) is extended in terms of time periods, number of countries and incorporates the procedure of Bleaney, Gemmell and Kneller (1999, 2001) to correct for bias in the estimates of the effects of fiscal policy in growth.

1 Introduction

Is there any relationship between fiscal policy and the degree of openness of an economy, when we are concerned about long run growth? The relation between growth and each one of these topics is largely explored in the literature, but very few papers try to establish some connection between these two factors conditioning economic growth. Broadly evaluating the effect of economic policy on growth, Easterly (2005) summarizes the general state of the literature:

> "These papers have at least one common feature: they all find that some indicator of national policy is strongly linked with economic growth, which confirms the argument

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made by Levine and Renelt (1992) – even though Levine and Renelt found that it was difficult to discern which policy matters for growth. The list of national economic policies that have received most extensive attention are fiscal policy, inflation, black market premiums on foreign exchange, financial repression vs. financial development, real overvaluation of the exchange rate, and openness to trade. The recommendation that countries pursue good policies on all these dimensions was labeled by Williamson (1985) as the 'Washington Consensus'."

Thus, the main focus of the literature is to find the proper relation between a set of policy variables and growth, without further investigation about the relations among those policies. In fact, as the two pictures in figure 1 show, there is not a clear relation between fiscal policy, measured by the government share of the GDP, and the degree of openness, despite both variables seem to have a clear relation with the real GDP growth[1].



Figure 1: Real GDP growth, Government Share and Openness

In this paper, I present some empirical evidence that fiscal policy and the openness to trade may be complementary policies, in a sense that distortions caused by government expenditure and taxation do not have the same magnitude when the economy becomes more open to trade. More specifically, the empirical exercise shows that the coefficients associated with government revenues and expenditure in a growth regression are somehow associated with the degree of openness of the economy, where the higher the effects of fiscal policy on growth are, the closer the economy is. Thus, the distortions generated by fiscal policy in the economy are eased once the economy becomes more

[1] In this area, one of the most recent contributions, comes from Aizenman, Kletzer and Pinto (2007): from the empirical perspective, the authors note that public investment is highly influenced by the openness of the current account. Their theoretical model does not take explicitly into account the effect of the external sector in growth, but the empirical motivation is present.

open. However, and this is a challenge for future research, the possible complementarity between the two policies did not result in higher long run growth, at least with this sample: the comparison between countries with different degrees of openness does not detect significative difference in the economic performance of the last 40 years.

The paper is organized as follows: beyond this introduction, section 2 details the methodology and the procedures for the estimated growth regressions, comparing with the baseline exercise of chapter 12 in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004); section 3 presents the exercise and discuss the main results; section 4 concludes.

2 Methodology and the Bias from the Budget Constraint

The econometric methodology tried to mimic, as much as possible, the procedure detailed in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), incorporating some improvements in data and the bias correction for the budget constraint, proposed by Bleaney, Gemmell and Kneller (1999, 2001). The methodology, partially following the procedure by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), also improves aspects related with the estimation in Bleaney, Gemmell and Kneller (1999). However, before the details of the estimation, it is worth to exploring the problem of growth regressions when they do not take into account that the government expenditure is one element of the whole budget[2].

A general formulation of the government budget constraint in an economy is given by:

$$\begin{aligned} S_t &= REV_t - G_t \\ S_t &= \tau_t + \Pi_t - g_t - iD_t + D_{t+1} \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

where S_t is the superavit of the government, REV_t is the total amount of revenues, G_t it the total expenditure, τ_t is the amount raised in taxes, Π_t represents other revenues, g_t is the expenditure not related with debt and $iD_t + D_{t+1}$ is the allocation of the government in bonds, paying to the public iD_t from previous bonds emissions and obtaining D_{t+1} with new bonds. It is very common in the literature to consider only g_t as a representation of fiscal policy in order to evaluate its effects on growth. Thus, a general growth regression is given by:

$$\Delta y_t = \alpha X_t + \beta_1 g_t + \varepsilon_t \tag{2}$$

where Δy_t is the real GDP growth, X_t is a matrix of variables not related with fiscal policy and ε_t is the residual of the regression. Note, however, that g_t can be replaced in the regression by the

[2] This explanation is heavily based in Bleaney, Gemmell and Kneller (1999, 2001)

whole budget constraint:

$$\Delta y_t = X_t A + \beta_1 \left(S_t - \tau_t - \Pi_t + iD_t - D_{t+1} \right) + \varepsilon_t \tag{3}$$

Assuming the presence of distortionary components, as an example, in taxes (τ_t), the "true" relationship between growth and the components of the budget constraint can be written as:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta y_t &= X_t A + B_1 S_t + B_2 \tau_t + B_3 \Pi_t + B_4 i D_t + B_5 D_{t+1} + u_t \\ \Delta y_t &= X_t A + \sum_{i=1}^{5} B_i Y_{i,t} + u_t \end{aligned} \tag{4}$$

with $Y_{i,t}$ representing the vector of variables. Given that all the elements of the budget constraint can not be part of the regression, as it creates a multicollinearity problem, the estimated equation in 3 will be given by:

$$\Delta y_t = X_t A + \sum_{i=1}^{5} C_i Y_{i,t} + \varepsilon_t \tag{5}$$

with $C_i = B_i - \beta_1$. As a consequence, the test for significance of C_i will be verifying, in fact, the equality between the effects of different components of the budget constraint in terms of the omitted variable – in this case, the government expenditure. Thus, in the simple case of regressions including only the government expenditure, the estimated coefficient reflects, in fact, the sum of the effects of all the other components of the government budget constraint on economic growth. Taking care of this bias, Bleaney, Gemmell and Kneller (1999) estimate a growth regression in the same lines as in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), aggregating variables between a time span of 5 years and controlling the evolution of each period with dummies. In a posterior work, Bleaney, Gemmell and Kneller (2001), the authors change the econometric framework, estimating the model using a dynamic panel data structure. In both exercises, as expected, the authors find significant responses from all the components of the government budget constraint and, more important, with all the variables with proper signs – the negative sign usually associated with the government expenditure disappears, as the distortion from taxes and debt is now included in the equation.

Given that the estimation procedure is quite standard in the literature, it becomes easier to highlight what is new in the exercise here comparing with two benchmarks in the literature. First, the main differences between the estimation in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) and this study:

1. Time span: the authors divide the sample in three ten-year periods: 1965-1975, 1975-1985 and 1985-1995. Here, given the dataset available from the Penn World Tables, an extra decade was added in the exercise, covering the period between 1995-2005;

2. Control variables: given some restrictions based on the extension of databases on institutional factors, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) usually extrapolate back the value of some indices,

relying heavily on the assumption of stability of institutions across time. I replaced the indices of democracy and rule of law adopted by the POLITY IV index, which covers all the sample, even providing the necessary set of instruments for the earliest period – in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), the assumption of constant values back to 1965 implies that the instrument set is equivalent to the set of regressors, i.e., the variables are exogenous in those periods. In this paper, the "partial exogeneity" assumption was only adopted for the IMF dataset on government finance for the first part of the sample;

3. Fiscal variables: the authors, following the tradition in growth regressions, include only the government share of the GDP in their exercise. Following Bleaney, Gemmell and Kneller (1999, 2001), data on government revenues and expenditure from the IMF – Government Finance Statistics database were used to compose the fiscal framework in the regression.

The differences between the exercise proposed by Bleaney, Gemmell and Kneller (1999, 2001) and this one are given by:

1. Time span and data frequency: their regression covers the period 1970-1995 taking five-years averages of the data, while here the sample is expanded until 2004 and the aggregation is based on ten-years averages;

2. Sample of countries: the authors concentrated in OECD countries. Here, the largest possible dataset available for the maximum number of countries was used;

3. Decomposition of the budget constraint: Bleaney, Gemmell and Kneller (1999, 2001) classify the expenditures and revenues respectively in productive and non-productive, distortionary and non-distortionary. Given problems with data reliability from developing countries, the main regression here tries to access only the effects of total expenditure and total revenues on GDP growth;

4. Set of variables added to the regression not related with fiscal policy: in the benchmark exercise, the authors use only the growth rate of the labor force and the investment share of the GDP in the regressions, adding later, as a robustness test, the initial value. As I tried to stay as close as possible to the dataset used in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), the set of additional variables is larger here: measures related with human capital, like the fertility rate and the (inverse of) life expectancy, and with other control variables of the economy, like the POLITY IV index complement the set of variables in the regression with success.

In order to complement the methodological details, the estimation is made using two-stages least squares with robust variance-covariance matrix and a correction in terms of degrees of freedom in the standard errors for small samples.

3 Growth Regressions: Controlling for the Budget Constraint

The descriptive statistics of the data on output and government revenues and expenditure as a proportion of the GDP is presented in table 1[3]. The final dataset has 141 observations, almost equally distributed across the four periods. The average per capita growth oscillated significantly across periods, with the highest mean verified in the first period, and the lowest matching the period of crisis during the 1970's. On the other hand, in terms of fiscal policy, the period between 1965-1975 was the one with lowest government expenditures and revenues, while the last period is marked by the highest average proportion of government participation in the GDP.

Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics

	Full sample	1965-1975	1975-1985	1985-1995	1995-2005
Number of observations	141	33	39	38	31
Real GDP Per Capita Growth					
Mean	0.0224888	0.0360695	0.0158074	0.0176719	0.0223423
Std.Dev.	0.0223514	0.0171446	0.0215187	0.0273816	0.0147076
Max	0.0780443	0.0727519	0.0598911	0.0780443	0.0683814
Min	-0.0703105	-0.0147724	-0.0703105	-0.0669065	-0.0060997
Government Expenditures					
Mean	0.2272243	0.1807444	0.2200279	0.2190974	0.2957182
Std.Dev.	0.1106972	0.0930727	0.1197206	0.095504	0.105665
Max	0.701691	0.5478584	0.701691	0.4462622	0.4535428
Min	0.0179155	0.0179155	0.0209071	0.0604412	0.127257
Government Revenues					
Mean	0.2234898	0.1835354	0.2118685	0.2141317	0.2921132
Std.Dev.	0.1052469	0.0834362	0.1175319	0.0953182	0.0930321
Max	0.5924286	0.4022945	0.5924286	0.4713781	0.4308301
Min	0.020767	0.020767	0.0211176	0.0613881	0.1376997

The final specification for the growth regression used, beyond the government and openness variables, the fertility rate ($Fert$), the initial income ($y(0)$) and the (reciprocal of) life expectancy (LE) as state variables; and the investment share of GDP (Iy), the democracy indicator ($Dem(t)$) and its square, as control variables. Dummies for each subperiod are included to control the average different growth rate levels in each decade. The remaining variables used in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), like inflation, terms of trade and educational attainment, were removed from the estimation,

[3]Data on the measure of openness was not included in the descriptive statistics table because the interpretation of the measurement is not straightforward: following Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1994), the sum of exports and imports over GDP is filtered by a regression with the population and the area of the country as explanatory variables. The residual of this regression is used as the measure of openness.

as they were not significant and didn't alter the main presented results. The regression also follows Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) in the determination of variable exogeneity and the selection of instruments. Thus, the variables $Fert$ and LE, set in the beginning of every period, are considered exogenous, while $y(0), Iy, Dem(t)$ and the square of $Dem(t)$ are instrumented by their own past values. The fiscal variables and the measure of openness are also considered control variables. As a consequence, they are also instrumented with their own past values.

Table 2 reports results for the full sample and the partial regressions, sorting the sample by the degree of openness. In terms of general results, the signal of all variables is exactly as expected. Note that the bias correction for fiscal variables, proposed by Bleaney, Gemmell and Kneller (1999, 2001) results in proper signs of variables, with the government revenues reducing the growth rate of the economy and the government expenditure working in the opposite direction.

The table highlights the difference between the coefficients of the first 70 observations of the total sample, sorted ascending by the index of openness, and the remaining dataset. Thus, the first 70 observations with the lowest degree of openess constitute the block of "closed" economies, while the remaining, as a consequence, are defined as the "open" economies. The regression in the second column shows that "closed" countries have coefficients associated with government expenditure and revenues higher, in absolute value, than those estimated for the whole sample. On the other hand, the regression of the third column shows that the same coefficients for "open" economies, not only are indifferent from zero, but their magnitude is also approximately one-tenth of the estimated coefficient for the closed economies. Also for the "open" economies, the coefficient associated with the openness index becomes marginally significant (p-value of 0.113). It is worth highlighting that these are the main differences across equations, as almost all other coefficients remained relatively constant among regressions.

For all three regressions, the sum of the coefficients associated with government expenditure and government revenues is not indifferent of zero (p-values for the estimations of columns 1 to 3 are 0.5496, 0.5055 and 0.9408, respectivelly). This result implies that the same equations could be equally estimated using only the superavit of the government as the variable representing the fiscal block affecting the growth. In fact, Bleaney, Gemmell and Kneller (2001) suggest that this procedure must be done in order to avoid potential bias in the estimation from ommiting variables with negligible growth effects. The results of the estimation of the model imposing the restriction are given in table 3.

The results of the new regression are markedly different than those obtained by Bleaney, Gemmell and Kneller (1999,2001). The authors find a strong, positive relation between the government superavit and economic growth. Here, the sign is inverted. All other variables remained with values really close to those presented in table 2. According to the authors, a small positive sign in the surplus would be the expected result, given that individuals would spend more in the present if they know that future taxes would be lower. As a consequence, the model specified here depends

crucially on the assignment of at least two fiscal variables to describe the effects of fiscal policy in growth, as the aggregate values used in the regressions include distortionary components both on the side of the revenues as in the side of the expenditures. Irrespective of the problem with the signal bias, it must be highlighted that the coefficient associated with the government surplus was more precisely estimated in the equation for the "closed" economies.

Table 2 – Growth Regressions: Benchmark Results

	Regressions		
	Full Sample	"Closed" Countries	"Open" Countries
Constant	0.2904635	0.4020261	0.2780658
	(6.22*)	(2.97*)	(4.54*)
D1	0.0285574	0.0298913	0.0211942
	(4.75*)	(2.86*)	(2.52*)
D2	0.004184	0.0013113	0.0065079
	(0.89)	(0.18)	(0.96)
D3	−0.0007299	−0.0007348	0.0018202
	(−0.16)	(−0.10)	(0.31)
$Fert$	−0.0367174	−.0371132	−0.032917
	(−5.73*)	(−3.68*)	(−3.52*)
$y(0)$	−0.0213028	−0.0257174	−0.0234381
	(−5.37*)	(−3.25*)	(−4.23*)
LE	−2.958826	−7.026885	−1.834958
	(−2.74*)	(−1.39)	(−1.54)
$Dem(t)$	0.0005734	−0.0004122	0.0014813
	(1.10)	(−0.67)	(1.74)
$Dem(t)^2$	−0.000185	−0.0001703	−0.0001135
	(−2.27*)	(−1.32)	(−1.00)
Iy	0.0213805	0.0040289	0.0322442
	(0.92)	(0.06)	(1.13)
Government Expenditure	0.1115766	0.2058576	0.0397948
	(2.25)	(1.96)	(0.58)
Government Revenues	−0.0995946	−0.1902072	−0.0368019
	(−2.11)	(−1.84)	(−0.62)
Openness	0.005608	0.0197309	0.0113931
	(1.04)	(0.63)	(1.58)
Obs.	141	71	70
R^2	0.4462	0.4041	0.4788

Obs: 2SLS regression with robust standard errors. t-statistic in parenthesis. (*) means significance at 5%.

Table 3 – Growth Regressions: Restricted Fiscal Sector

	Regressions		
	Full Sample	"Closed" Countries	"Open" Countries
Constant	0.2818079	0.3937273	0.2775475
	(5.91*)	(3.96*)	(4.32*)
D1	0.0272254	0.0292851	0.0207936
	(4.77*)	(2.89*)	(2.43*)
D2	0.0031557	0.0003011	0.006241
	(0.69)	(0.04)	(0.92)
D3	−0.0013698	−0.0014407	0.0016679
	(−0.33)	(−0.20)	(0.30)
$Fert$	−0.0356166	−0.0368114	−0.0327223
	(−5.64*)	(−2.90*)	(−3.67*)
$y(0)$	−0.0202916	−0.0242555	−0.023336
	(−4.87*)	(−3.03*)	(−4.09*)
LE	−2.899657	−7.062999	−1.834074
	(−2.72*)	(−2.71*)	(−1.39)
$Dem(t)$	0.0005433	−0.0003859	0.0014648
	(1.18)	(−0.58)	(2.11*)
$Dem(t)^2$	−0.0001762	−0.0001747	−0.0001089
	(−2.24*)	(−1.33)	(−1.04)
Iy	0.0240856	−0.0003967	0.0325978
	(0.86)	(−0.01)	(0.96)
Government Surplus	−0.1139639	−0.2285937	−.0378383
	(−2.21*)	(−1.85)	(−0.60)
Openness	0.0059874	0.0194079	0.0114527
	(1.14)	(0.81)	(1.49)
Obs.	141	71	70
R^2	0.4485	0.3812	0.4816

Obs: 2SLS regression with robust standard errors. t-statistic in parenthesis. (*) means significance at 5%.

3.1 "Closed" or "Open" Economy: Does It Matter?

The hypothesis of a relation between the effects of trade openess on the distortions generated from fiscal policy tempt us to consider a new argument in favor of trade liberalization: after all, getting rid of the welfare loss created from taxation, as an example, would result in higher productivity and a larger growth. Surprisingly, this is not the case. Table 4 shows some tests of equality of means

and standard deviations across the groups of "closed" and "open" economies previously defined. In fact, the test accepts the null hypothesis of equality of the mean and the standard deviation of the GDP growth across the two groups. The test also accepts the null of equality of the means of government revenues and expenditures across the two groups, but, at 10% of significance, the test rejects the equality of the standard deviation of these variables. Thus, the group of "closed" economies, despite having similar economic performance in the long run, makes more use of the instruments of fiscal policy to reach the performance of the "open" economies group.

Table 4 – Means and Variances Across Groups

	"Closed" Economies	"Open" Economies	Test for Equality	P-Value
Mean: GDP growth	0.0227966	0.0221766	$t = 0.1641$	0.8699
	(0.0026829)	(0.0026592)		
Std. dev: GDP growth	0.0226063	0.0222486	$f = 1.0324$	0.8951
Mean: Gov. revenues	0.2117488	0.2353984	$t = -1.3378$	0.1831
	(0.0137779)	(0.0110297)		
Std. dev.: Gov. revenues	0.1160947	0.0922814	$f = 1.5827$	0.0578
Mean: Gov. expenditure	0.2189817	0.2355845	$t = -0.8898$	0.3751
	(0.0150391)	(0.0109747)		
Std. dev: Gov. expenditure	0.1267213	0.0918210	$f = 1.9047$	0.0080

Obs.: Values in brackets are the standard errors of the estimation of the mean.

4 Conclusion

The paper presented an extended version of the traditional growth regression, trying to deal with problems associated with the determination of the impact of fiscal policy on economic growth. The estimation was extended both in the time and in the individual (number of countries) dimensions, when compared with other papers in the literature. The use of the procedure described in Bleaney, Gemmell and Kneller (1999,2001) under the same low-data frequency adopted in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1994) showed very appropriate results. In terms of results, the association between fiscal policy and openess is still an issue to be better described, both empirically and theoretically. Once confirmed the main empirical results of the paper – the negative relation between openess and distortion related from the fiscal policy – the next challenge consists in understanding why the gain from opening the economy does not reflect in the economic growth.

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5 Appendix I: Description of the Variables

5.1 From the Penn World Tables – Version 6.2

All the variables from the Penn World Tables are measured in constant prices, except, for obvious reasons, the population. Description of the variables:

- POP – Average population in the time span. For the main equations, POP is the mean of the ten-year period block starting in 1965, 1975, 1985 and 1995. As an instrument, POP is the average population of the five-year periods 1960-1964, 1970-1974, 1980-1984 and 1990-1994. Code in the PWT: POP.

- Δy – Real GDP per capita growth, measured from the chain index. It is the average of the ten-year periods starting in 1965, 1975, 1985 and 1995. Code in the PWT: GRGDPCH.

- $y\,(0)$ – Level of the Real GDP per capita growth from the chain index, measured in 1965, 1975, 1985 and 1995. The instrument for this variable is the level of the Real GDP per capita measured in 1960, 1970, 1980 and 1990. In the case of missing values in the instrument list, the value was replaced by the first number available in the dataset. Code in the PWT: RGDPCH.

- Iy – Investment share in the real, constant prices, GDP. For the main equations, it is measured as the average of the ten-year periods starting in 1965, 1975, 1985 and 1995. As instruments, it is the average of the five-year periods 1960-1964, 1970-1974, 1980-1984 and 1990-1994. Code in the PWT: KI.

- Gy – Government share in the real, constant prices, GDP. For the main equations, it is measured as the average of the ten-year periods starting in 1965, 1975, 1985 and 1995. As instruments, it is the average of the five-year periods 1960-1964, 1970-1974, 1980-1984 and 1990-1994. Code in the PWT: KG.

- $OPEN$ – Degree of openness, measured as the sum of imports and exports, divided by the GDP. It is the total trade share in the GDP, measured in constant prices. For the main equations, it is measured as the average of the ten-year periods starting in 1965, 1975, 1985

and 1995. As instruments, it is the average of the five-year periods 1960-1964, 1970-1974, 1980-1984 and 1990-1994. Code in the PWT: OPENK.

5.2 From the World Development Indicators – World Bank

- Δp – Inflation rate, measured by percentage changes of the GDP deflator. It is the average of the ten-year periods starting in 1965, 1975, 1985 and 1995. As instruments, it is the average of the five-year periods 1960-1964, 1970-1974, 1980-1984 and 1990-1994.

- $Fert$ – Fertility rate, defined as the average number of births per woman in the population. Data estimated by the World Bank. In the regressions, it is the (log of) values in 1965, 1975, 1985 and 1995.

- LE – Life expectancy at birth, defined as the number of years a child is expected to life if the patterns of mortality rates prevail during her entire life. In the regressions, it is the (reciprocal of) values in 1960, 1970, 1980 and 1990.

5.3 From the IMF – Government Finance Statistics

- Government Expenditure: total expenditure of the Central Government as a proportion of the GDP. Average values for each ten-year period starting in 1965, 1975, 1985 and 1995.

- Government Revenues: total revenues of the Central Government as a proportion of the GDP. Average values for each ten-year period starting in 1965, 1975, 1985 and 1995.

5.4 Other Sources

- Dem – Index of democracy deepness, measured by the variable POLITY2 from the Polity IV database (http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm). The scale goes from -10 (absolute dictatorship) to 10 (consolidated democracy).

- Sch – Average years of total schooling for people with 25 years or older. From the dataset in Barro and Lee (2000), updated until 2000. Data refer to the years 1965, 1975, 1985 and 1995.

- Sch_m – Average years of total schooling for male with 25 years or older. From the dataset in Barro and Lee (2000), updated until 2000. Data refer to the years 1965, 1975, 1985 and 1995.

- S_Sch – Average years of secondary schooling for people with 25 years or older. From the dataset in Barro and Lee (2000), updated until 2000. Data refer to the years 1965, 1975, 1985 and 1995.

- S_Sch_m – Average years of secondary schooling for male with 25 years or older. From the dataset in Barro and Lee (200), updated until 2000. Data refer to the years 1965, 1975, 1985 and 1995.

Data on schooling available at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html

6 Appendix II: List of Countries in the Exercise

Argentina	France	Mauritius	Thailand
Austria	Gambia, The	Mexico	Togo
Bangladesh	Germany	Morocco	Tunisia
Belgium	Ghana	Netherlands	Uganda
Benin	Greece	New Zealand	United Arab Emirates
Botswana	Guatemala	Nicaragua	United Kingdom
Burkina Faso	Haiti	Niger	United States
Burundi	Honduras	Nigeria	Uruguay
Cameroon	Hungary	Norway	Venezuela
Canada	Indonesia	Panama	Zambia
Central African Republic	Iran	Paraguay	
Chad	Ireland	Philippines	
Colombia	Israel	Poland	
Comoros	Italy	Portugal	
Congo, Republic of	Japan	Rwanda	
Costa Rica	Jordan	Senegal	
Denmark	Kenya	Singapore	
Dominican Republic	Korea, Republic of	South Africa	
Ecuador	Kuwait	Spain	
Egypt	Madagascar	Swaziland	
Fiji	Malawi	Sweden	
Finland	Mali	Switzerland	