The (London) Economist, January 21, 1995, pp. 38-39 CONFUCIANISM: NEW FASHION FOR OLD WISDOM A generation ago, it would have seemed bizarre to argue that Confucianism was relevant to the modern world. in China, the birthplace of Confucianism, the philosophy was abandoned and reviled. Elsewhere in Asia the thoughts of a sage who died in 479BC seemed of interest only to antiquarians. The economic rise of East Asia, however, has brought Confucianism back into vogue. Confronted with the success of countries with economic policies as diverse as those of Taiwan and South Korea, some academics have looked to culture for an explanation and concluded that "Confucian ethics", stressing the claims of the community over the individual, are the key. If Confucianism leads both to increased economic power in East Asia and promotes values different from those espoused by western democracies, there may be a potential for conflict. Samuel Huntington, a Harvard academic, explored the idea in 1993 in a much-talked-of article, "The Clash of Civilisations?"(FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Summer 1993, pp. 22-49). Mr Huntington argued that the "principal conflicts of global politics" are now likely to spring from cultural clashes and pointed to Confucianism as one of the main challenges to the West's ideological ascendancy. But though Mr Huntington identified Confucianism as important, he never attempted to define it. Indeed, one of the problems with the debate about Confucianism is that even Confucian scholars cannot agree on what they are talking about. Part religion, part ethical code; part social ritual and part political philosophy, it remains a slippery concept. The summary of a recent academic conference noted, with a touch of despair, that "some even raised the challenging question of whether Confucianism-a system of ideas founded on Confucian values-is real or merely imagined by scholars." "The Analects", a collection of Confucius's aphorisms recorded by his disciples 2,500 years ago, does not help much. Confucius's answer to the question of how a state should be governed is typically baffling: "Follow the calendar of the Hsia, ride in the carriage of the Yin, and wear the ceremonial cap of the Chou, but, as for music, adopt the shao and the wu. Banish the tunes of Cheng and keep plausible men at a distance." Yet some basic themes-such as the importance of benevolent and moral government and a stress on filial piety-emerge clearly. moreover, the modern idea of Confucianism has transcended its historical and textual origins and become a codeword for a set of "Asian" values: commitment to education and family loyalty, and a quiescent attitude to authoritarian rule, where the government assumes the role of the father in a family. According to Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore's former prime minister, "A Confucianist view of order between subject and ruler-this helps in the rapid transfor- mation of society ... in other words, you fit yourself into society-the exact opposite of the American rights of the individual." The idea that Confucianism may represent a potent economic force stands a century of conventional wisdom on its head. Max We- ber, a German sociologist, who searched for the cultural roots of western capitalism in the Protestant ethic, argued influentially that Confucianism was largely responsible for the economic backwardness of China. in Weber's view, Puritanism "substituted ra- tional law and agreement for tradition." By contrast, in China "the pervasive factors were tradition, local custom and the personal favour of the official." Confucius himself seems actively opposed to the pursuit of profit. in "The Analects", he comments that "If one is guided by profit in one's actions, one will incur much ill- will." The ideal Confucian gentleman is a scholar bureaucrat. Yet the rise of Japan and the East Asian tigers has caused many people to reinterpret the economic impact of Confucianism. One of the earliest attempts was made by Roderick MacFarquhar, now a Harvard professor, writing in The Economist in 1980. Mr MacFarquhar argued that what he called "post-Confucian characteristics" like "self-confidence, social cohesion, subordination of the individual, education for action, bureaucratic tradition and moralising certitude are a potent combination for development purposes." This revisionist argument has now become a new orthodoxy, echoed in many articles and books., The link, of course, is unprovable, but then nobody has come up with an alternative grand theory that satisfactorily identifies the origins of East Asian success. In Asia, Confucianism has a particular appeal as an explanation: it accounts for East Asia's rise in terms of local virtues, rather than universal ones or international economic shifts, and at the same time describes a political philosophy that provides politicians with an alternative to western liberalism. One of the first hints of the potential political significance of Confucianism came in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989. Just weeks after the suppression of the pro- democracy movement in China, a grand celebration of Confucius's birthday was held in a building near the square. Jiang Zemin, the secretary-general of the Chinese Communist Party, made a personal appearance in which he fondly recalled the Confucian influences in his upbringing. Gu Mu, the chairman of the conference, gave a speech that was widely reckoned to reflect the party line. Confu- cianism, he declared, represented "the mainstream" in Chinese culture. For the Chinese Communist Party to embrace Confucianism was a remarkable reversal. Mao's enemies had frequently been reviled as "Confucianists". But the transition from communism to Confucianism is fitting. Though the government has abandoned communist economics, it abhors political liberalisation. Confucianism is evidently compatible with economic success, and maybe even contributes to it. At the same time, by elevating the welfare of the community over the individual, it could provide a convenient cloak for the authoritarian actions of a ruling party that claims to speak for "the people". Many liberals, both in Asia and in the West, regard the vogue for Confucianism with great suspicion for precisely this reason. In Singapore, the only East Asian country to have explicitly promoted the teaching of Confucian values in schools, the ruling People's Action Party seems to see little distinction between its own interests and the interests of Singaporeans as a whole. Yet it would be unfair to regard Singapore's interest in Confucian values as entirely cynical. Its leaders, who take a cosmopolitan interest in academic and political debates in the West, observe with fear and distaste the breakdown of the family in the West. They hope that the promotion of Confucian beliefs in Singapore will help avert the decay of the family structure, and avoid the social and economic consequences that follow from it. But those who regard neo-Confucianism as the wave of the future in East Asian politics should take a closer look. In some places, there are signs that the authoritarian model is in retreat. Recent political developments in South Korea and Taiwan have un- dermined the systems of authoritarian paternalism, once assumed to reflect the immutably Confucian natures of these societies. And in Japan, as the old political order breaks down, once-deferential voters are showing themselves to be impatient and questioning. In relations between subjects and governments, parents and children, Asians themselves note that the deference to authority that is central to the Confucian model is losing strength. That in itself may be one of the reasons for the reassertion of Confucian values: people often turn back to old beliefs in times of rapid change. As divorce rates and delinquency rise in Asia, as voters become less acquiescent, so fathers and rulers insist that the old, obedient ways are best. Maybe, then, Confucianism is in fashion because the way of life it prescribes is in decline. Samuel P. Huntington THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS? Foreign Affairs Summer 1993 (First part of the article, pp 22-28) THE NEXT PATTERN OF CONFLICT World politics is entering a new phase, and intellectuals have not hesitated to proliferate visions of what it will be-the end of history, the return of traditional rivalries between nation states, and the decline of the nation state from the conflicting pulls of tribalism and globalism, among others. Each of these visions catches aspects of the emerging reality. Yet they all miss a crucial, indeed a central, aspect of what global politics is likely to be in the coming years. It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilization will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future. Conflict between civilizations will be the latest phase in the evolution of conflict in the modern world. For a century and a half after the emergence of the modern international system with the Peace of Westphalia, the conflicts of the Western world were largely among princes-emperors, absolute monarchs and constitutional monarchs attempting to expand their bureaucracies, their armies, their mercantilist economic strength and, most important, the territory they ruled. In the process they created nation states, and beginning with the French Revolution the principal lines of conflict were between nations rather than princes. In I793, as R. R. Palmer put it, "The wars of kings were over; the wars of peoples had begun." This nineteenth century pattern lasted until the end of World War 1. Then, as a result of the Russian Revolution and the reaction against it, the conflict of nations yielded to the conflict of ideologies, first among communism, fascism-Nazism and liberal democracy, and then between communism and liberal democracy. During the Cold War, this latter conflict became embodied in the struggle between the two superpowers, neither of which was a nation state in the classical European sense and each of which defined its identity in terms of its ideology. These conflicts between princes, nation states and ideologies were primarily conflicts within Western civilization, "Western civil wars,' as William Lind has labeled them. This was as true of the Cold War as it was of the world wars and the earlier wars of the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. With the end of the Cold War, international politics moves out of its Western phase, and its centerpiece becomes the interaction between the West and non-Western civilizations and among non-Western civilizations. In the politics of civilizations, the peoples and governments of non-Western civilizations no longer remain the objects of history as targets of Western colonialism but join the West as movers and shapers of history. THE NATURE OF CIVILIZATIONS During the Cold War the world was divided into the First, Second and Third Worlds. Those divisions are no longer relevant. It is far more meaningful now to group countries not in terms of their political or economic systems or in terms of their level of economic development but rather in terms of their culture and civilization. What do we mean when we talk of a civilization? A civilization is a cultural entity. Villages, regions, ethnic groups, nationalities, religious groups, all have distinct cultures at different levels of cultural heterogeneity. The culture of a village in southern Italy may be different from that of a village in northern Italy, but both will share in a common Italian culture that distinguishes them from German villages. European communities, in turn, will share cultural features that distinguish them from Arab or Chinese communities. Arabs, Chinese and Westerners, however, are not part of any broader cultural entity. They constitute civilizations. A civilization is thus the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species. It is defined both by common objective elements, such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people. People have levels of identity: a resident of Rome may define himself with varying degrees of intensity as a Roman, an Italian, a Catholic, a Christian, a European, a Westerner. The civilization to which he belongs is the broadest level of identification with which he intensely identifies. People can and do redefine their identities and, as a result, the composition and boundaries of civilizations change. Civilizations may involve a large number of people, as with China ("a civilization pretending to be a state,' as Lucian Pye put it), or a very small number of people, such as the Anglophone Caribbean. A civilization may include several nation states, as is the case with Western, Latin American and Arab civilizations, or only one, as is the case with Japanese civilization. Civilizations obviously blend and overlap, and may include subcivilizations. Western civilization has two major variants, European and North American, and Islam has its Arab, Turkic and Malay subdivisions. Civilizations are nonetheless meaningful entities, and while the lines between them are seldom sharp, they are real. Civilizations are dynamic; they rise and fall; they divide and merge. And, as any student of history knows, civilizations disappear and are buried in the sands of time. Westerners tend to think of nation states as the principal actors in global wars. They have been that, however, for only a few centuries. The broader reaches of human history have been the history of civilizations. In A Study of history, Arnold Toynbee identified 2I major civilizations; only six of them exist in the contemporary world. WHY CIVILIZATIONS WILL CLASH CIVILIZATION IDENTITY will be increasingly important in the future, and the world will be shaped in large measure by the interactions among seven or eight major civilizations. These include Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox and possibly African civilization. The most important conflicts of the future will occur along the cultural fault lines separating these civilizations from one another. Why will this be the case? First, differences among civilizations are not only real; they are basic. Civilizations are differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, tradition and, most important, religion. The people of different civilizations have different views on the relations between God and man, the individual and the group, the citizen and the state, parents and children, husband and wife, as well as differing views of the relative importance of rights and responsibilities, liberty and authority, equality and hierarchy. These differences are the product of centuries. They win not soon disappear. They are far more fundamental than differences among political ideologies and political regimes. Differences do not necessarily mean conflict, and conflict does not necessarily mean violence. Over the centuries, however, differences among civilizations have generated the most prolonged and the most violent conflicts. Second, the world is becoming a smaller place. The interactions between peoples of different civilizations are increasing; these increasing interactions intensify civilization consciousness and awareness of differences between civilizations and commonalities within civilizations. North African immigration to France generates hostility among Frenchmen and at the same time increased receptivity to immigration by "good" European Catholic Poles. Americans react far more negatively to Japanese investment than to larger investments from Canada and European countries. Similarly, as Donald Horowitz has pointed out, "An Ibo may be ... an Owerri Ibo or an Onitsha Ibo in what was the Eastern region of Nigeria. In Lagos, he is simply an Ibo. In London, he is a Nigerian. In New York, he is an African.' The interactions among peoples of different civilizations enhance the civilization-consciousness of people that, in turn, invigorates differences and animosities stretching or thought to stretch back deep into history. Third, the processes of economic modernization and social change throughout the world are separating people from longstanding local identities. They also weaken the nation state as a source of identity. In much of the world religion has moved in to fill this gap, often in the form of movements that are labeled "fundamentalist." Such movements are found in Western Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism and Hinduism, as well as in Islam. In most countries and most religions the people active in fundamentalist movements are young, college-educated, middle-class technicians, professionals and business persons. The "unsecularization of the world,' George Weigel has remarked, "is one of the dominant social facts of life in the late twentieth century." The revival of religion, "la revanche de Dieu," as Gilles Kepel labeled it, provides a basis for identity and commitment that transcends national boundaries and unites civilizations. Fourth, the growth of civilization-consciousness is enhanced by the dual role of the West. On the one hand, the West is at a peak of power. At the same time, however, and perhaps as a result, a return to the roots phenomenon is occurring among non-Western civilizations. Increasingly one hears references to trends toward a turning inward and "Asianization" in Japan, the end of the Nehru legacy and the "Hinduization" of India, the failure of Western ideas of socialism and nationalism and hence "re-Islamization" of the Middle East, and now a debate over Westernization versus Russianization in Boris Yeltsin's country. A West at the peak of its power confronts non-Wests that increasingly have the desire, the will and the resources to shape the world in non-Western ways. In the past, the elites of non-Western societies were usually the people who were most involved with the West, had been educated at Oxford, the Sorbonne or Sandhurst, and had absorbed Western attitudes and values. At the same time, the populace in non- Western countries often remained deeply imbued with the indigenous culture. Now, however, these relationships are being reversed. A deWesternization and indigenization of elites is occurring in many non-Western countries at the same time that Western, usually American, cultures, styles and habits become more popular among the mass of the people. Fifth, cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable and hence less easily compromised and resolved than political and economic ones. In the former Soviet Union, communists can become democrats, the rich can become poor and the poor rich, but Russians cannot become Estonians and Azeris cannot become Armenians. In class and ideological conflicts, the key question was "Which side are you on?' and people could and did choose sides and change sides. In conflicts between civilizations, the question is "What are you?' That is a given that cannot be changed. And as we know, from Bosnia to the Caucasus to the Sudan, the wrong answer to that question can mean a bullet in the head. Even more than ethnicity, religion discriminates sharply and exclusively among people. A person can be half-French and half- Arab and simultaneously even a citizen of two countries. It is more difficult to be half-Catholic and half-Muslim. Finally, economic regionalism is increasing. The proportions of total trade that were intraregional rose between 1980 and 1989 from 51 percent to 59 percent in Europe, 33 percent to 37 percent in East Asia, and 32 percent to 36 percent in North America. The importance of regional economic blocs is likely to continue to increase in the future. On the one hand, successful economic regionalism will reinforce civilization-consciousness. On the other hand, economic regionalism may succeed only when it is rooted in a common civilization. The European Community rests on the shared foundation of European culture and Western Christianity. The success of the North American Free Trade Area depends on the convergence now underway of Mexican, Canadian and American cultures. Japan, in contrast, faces difficulties in creating a comparable economic entity in East Asia because Japan is a society and civilization unique to itself. However strong the trade and investment links Japan may develop with other East Asian countries, its cultural differences with those countries inhibit and perhaps preclude its promoting regional economic integration like that in Europe and North America. Common culture, in contrast, is clearly facilitating the rapid expansion of the economic relations between the People's Republic of China and Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and the overseas Chinese communities in other Asian countries. With the Cold War over, cul- tural commonalities increasingly overcome ideological differences, and mainland China and Taiwan move closer together. If cultural commonality is a prerequisite for economic integration, the principal East Asian economic bloc of the future is likely to be centered on China. This bloc is, in fact, already coming into existence.